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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEBORAH A. MELLE 
Case No. 960657-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. Court Below No. 94-42-00105DA 
CHARLES M. BOVA, 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT 
1. In considering appellee/cross-appellant Ms. Melle's in-
come for purposes of calculating child support and alimony, did the 
trial court abuse its discretion by employing Ms. Melle's 
historical income as a part-time employee rather than creating a 
"full-time" income based on what she might earn were she able to 
work full time? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dividing the 
parties' real and personal property in approximately equal amounts? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by requiring 
appellant Dr. Bova to assume the debt on the Home Equity Line of 
Credit ("HELC") because he used the HELC for his own benefit? 
4. Is the capital gains tax issue moot? 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the 
tax dependency exemptions for the parties' minor children to the 
custodial parent, Ms. Melle, in light of the legal presumption in 
favor of awarding such exemptions to the custodial parent? 
6. Was the trial court's award of attorney fees to Ms. Melle 
an abuse of discretion based on her inability to pay, Dr. Bova's 
ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the amount of fees 
incurred? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT 
Ms. Melle agrees with Dr. Bova that all issues he raises on 
appeal are treated to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY CROSS-APPELLANT. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Ms. Melle presents the following issues for this Court's 
review: 
1. Did the trial court err in basing alimony and child 
support on Dr. Bova's alleged current income from his employment as 
a physician at the Spine Center, without including his income 
earned from the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah? This issue was 
preserved for appeal at R. 1170. This issue raises questions of 
law and fact. "We review the trial court's conclusions of law with 
respect to alimony awards for correctness, but we will not reverse 
the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Willey v. 
Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996). 
2. Did the trial court properly apply the Utah Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines to income in excess of the statutory tables? 
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This issue was preserved for appeal at R, 1172-3. Although in 
setting child support, the trial court acts within its sound 
discretion, its application of statutory guidelines is a question 
of law subject to review for correctness. Ball v. Peterson, 912 
P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996). 
3. Did the trial court err in requiring Ms. Melle to file a 
joint tax return for the 1994 tax year and in requiring her to bear 
the burden of the income tax on the $75,000 IRA withdrawal made by 
Dre Bova? This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1169-1170. 
"Changes will be made [to the property division] only if there was 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Naranjo v. 
Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988). 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to charge the $16,000 
gift made to Dr. Bova's daughter to him in the property division? 
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1181. This issue is 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Jefferies v. 
Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
The following statute is determinative of the second issue 
presented by Ms. Melle for appeal: 
Income in excess of tables. If the combined adjusted gross 
income exceeds the highest level specified in the [base 
combined child support obligation] table, an appropriate and 
just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case 
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basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children due 
support. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Both parties are appealing from the trial court's rulings 
regarding property division, child support and alimony, following 
trial on October 24-26, 1996, in this divorce action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Ms. Melle filed this action for divorce on August 3, 1994. 
After a three-day trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, the court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce on September 19, 1996. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law attached as "Addendum A;" Decree of Divorce attached as 
"Addendum B.") Ms. Melle moved for a new trial on January 19, 
1996, on the basis that, after the trial in this matter, she 
discovered financial documents indicating that Dr. Bova had made 
the bulk of a $16,000 "gift" to his daughter by a prior marriage 
after Ms. Melle filed for divorce. The trial court denied this 
motion, and Dr. Bova filed an appeal on February 27, 1997. 
Ms. Melle filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 6, 1997. 
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C. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The parties were married on June 28, 1980, and have two sons 
born of the marriage: Mikell Bova, born March 8, 1984; and 
Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987. (R. 1634, 1635 and 1882). 
1. WHILE MS. MELLE'S ADJUSTED GROSS MONTHLY INCOME IS 
$2,386, DR. BOVA'S ADJUSTED GROSS MONTHLY INCOME, 
$10,583, IS MUCH HIGHER. 
Dr. Bova is a physician board-certified in emergency medicine 
and specializing in sports medicine. (R. 2263). Beginning in 1991 
Dra Bova was employed as a physician with the Spine Center in West 
Valley City. (R. 2264). From the time he commenced employment 
there until July 1993, his terms of compensation with the Spine 
Center were fixed at $125,000 per year. (R. 2265-67). In 
September 1993 he entered a new contract with the Spine Center 
whereby his income was based on collections, which allowed him the 
potential to earn more money than he earned under the previous 
fixed-income arrangement. (R. 2268, 2281). However, the parties 
separated in 1994, and Dr. Bova's adjusted gross income per month 
from the Spine Center in 1994 was $9,583. (R. 1638). His work 
hours at the Spine Center are 8:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on Mondays, 
Tuesdays and Thursdays, and 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on Wednesdays 
and Fridays, meaning that he works twenty six hours per week to 
earn this income from the Spine Center. (R. 2294-95). 
In the spring of 1995 Dr. Bova began working for the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah reviewing files. (R. 2299). The undis-
puted evidence at trial was that Dr. Bova is paid an average of 
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$1,000 per month for these services in addition to what he earns at 
the Spine Center. (R. 2299, 2301). Thus, Dr. Bova's adjusted 
gross monthly income is $10,583. 
By contrast, Ms. Melle is employed part-time as a nurse 
paralegal at Kipp & Christian in Salt Lake City. (R. 1637). Ms. 
Melle had always worked on a part-time basis during the marriage 
because the parties agreed it would be best for the children to 
have a parent with them as much as possible. (R. 1637, 1908). At 
the time of trial, she worked twenty to thirty hours per week at 
Kipp & Christian. (R. 2163). However, the trial court multiplied 
her hourly wage of $18.50 by the maximum amount of hours she works 
in a given week (thirty hours) to reach a gross monthly income 
figure of $2,386.2 (R. 1638). 
Dr. Bova has presented no evidence that Ms. Melle could or 
should be working on a full-time basis. To the contrary, Ms. Melle 
cannot feasibly work full time. She was employed for a time at the 
Utah Womens' Clinic while she was also working at Kipp & Christian, 
In imputing gross monthly income of $9,583 to Dr. Bova, the 
court did not consider Dr. Bova's income from the Workers' 
Compensation Fund, believing Dr. Bova's income "as set forth on his 
W-2 form from the Spine Center [to be] the best indicator of the 
Defendant's income prior to the filing of this matter." (R. 1638). 
2 
Dr. Bova contends that Ms. Melle could be earning more as a 
nurse paralegal, pointing out that her hourly wage was higher when 
she worked as a nurse paralegal at Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
from October 1991 until August 1994, and that during her last month 
of employment with Snow, Christensen & Martineau, she made $5.25 
per hour more than she currently earns at Kipp & Christian. (R. 
1964, 2464). Nonetheless, Snow, Christensen & Martineau limited 
her to working part-time. (R. 2466). Additionally, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau terminated her employment, so there is no 
evidence to support Dr. Bova's speculative contention. (R. 2464). 
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but scheduling conflicts evolved between the two jobs, and she 
determined "that one job had to go or the other." (R. 1976, 1978). 
She chose to keep her job with Kipp & Christian because she enjoys 
working as a paralegal and earns more money at Kipp & Christian 
than she did at the Utah Womens' Clinic. (R. 1978-79). She hopes 
to work more hours per week at Kipp & Christian eventually, but she 
has not received an offer to work there full time. (R. 1979). 
2. DESPITE THE PARTIES' HIGH COMBINED ADJUSTED GROSS 
INCOME AND THE CHILDREN'S LIFESTYLE DURING THE 
MARRIAGE, THE COURT DECLINED TO SET CHILD SUPPORT 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.12. 
The parties stipulated that Ms. Melle should have physical 
custody of the children and that the parties would have joint legal 
custody, but that Ms. Melle would have decision-making authority 
regarding the childrens' activities, including sports activities. 
(R. 1635). The parties also agreed Dr. Bova would pay child 
support irrespective of the amount of days per month he had the 
children for visitation. (R. 1638). 
With Dr. Bova's monthly adjusted gross income determined by 
the trial court to be $9,583 and Ms. Melle's to be $2,386, the 
parties' combined monthly adjusted gross income came to $11,969 for 
purposes of computing child support obligations. (R. 1178). 
Because the highest combined income provided on the Base Combined 
Child Support Obligation Table in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 was 
$10,100, Ms. Melle urged Judge Noel to extrapolate beyond the 
highest level to determine the child support award, as permitted by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. (R. 1173). Ms. Melle explained the 
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childrens' need for support beyond the guidelines by pointing out 
that the children were accustomed during the marriage to 
participating in numerous sports activities, such as skiing schools 
and basketball, that cost more than $4,725 per year. (R. 1173, 
1919, 1924, 1935-36). She additionally noted that the majority of 
her monthly expenditures, such as food and transportation, directly 
benefited the children. Based on this need, Ms. Melle requested 
that Dr. Bova's child support obligations be set by extrapolating 
3 
beyond the Table. (R. 1173). Without explaining the reason for 
denying this request, the trial court set Dr. Bova's child support 
obligation at $1,400 per month. (R. 1639). 
3. MONTHLY ALIMONY OF $1200 WAS SET ACCORDING TO MS. 
MELLE'S NEEDS, INABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF AND THE 
CHILDREN, AND DR. BOVA'S ABILITY TO PAY. 
In determining an alimony amount, Judge Noel first considered 
Ms. Melle's need for spousal support, finding that her monthly 
The child support obligation for two children whose parents 
have combined income of $10,100 is $1,400. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.14. The parties' combined income was $1,869 above the highest 
level of combined income shown in the Table. According to the 
Table, the child support obligation for two children with parents' 
combined income of $1,869 is $517. Therefore, extrapolating from 
the Table to calculate Dr. Bova's child support requirement by 
adding these two figures, his obligation (assuming an adjusted 
gross monthly income for Dr. Bova of $9,583) should have been 9/11 
of $1,917, or approximately $1,568 per month. However, if Dr. 
Bova's income from the Utah Workers' Compensation Fund is taken 
into account (See Point VII of Brief), his adjusted gross monthly 
income is $10,853, bringing the parties' combined adjusted gross 
monthly income to $2,869 above the highest level of combined income 
listed on the Table. The child support obligation for two children 
with parents' combined income of $2,869 is $707. Dr. Bova's child 
support obligation should be 9/11 of $2,107, or approximately 
$1,724 per month. 
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expenses total $4,595. (R. 1640) . The trial court's assessment 
that Ms. Melle needs $4,595 per month to support herself and two 
children is conservative in view of the fact that Dr. Bova 
apparently needs $6,545 (the monthly expenses of $8,045 attributed 
to him minus $1,400 per month for child support) just to support 
himself. The trial court also examined Dr. Bova's ability to pay 
spousal support based on Dr. Bova's monthly expenses of $8,045, 
over $1,500 less per month than his adjusted gross monthly income. 
(R. 1639-40). The trial court observed a gap between Ms. Melle's 
monthly need of $4,595 and monthly after-tax income of $1,800 and 
child support of $1,400 per month and determined the gap could be 
partially closed by awarding $1,200 monthly in alimony. (R. 1639). 
Although Dr. Bova claims he barely earns enough to make ends 
meet, his lifestyle indicates his ability to pay spousal support. 
For example, at the same time he contended he could not afford to 
pay the $1,787 monthly mortgage on the parties' marital residence, 
he vacationed in Mexico, Florida, and Colorado a total of twenty 
days over a five-month period. (R. 1499-1500). He also paid over 
$24,000 in attorney fees devoted to the divorce by the time of 
trial. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 37). 
The trial court did not attempt to decrease the amount of 
alimony awarded by suggesting that Ms. Melle should be forced to 
find full-time employment to augment her ability to support 
herself. Rather, the best interests of the children weigh in favor 
of Ms. Melle working part time: 
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The Court finds that during the course of the marriage, 
the Plaintiff has always worked part-time since the birth 
of the children. Her part-time work schedule was dis-
cussed by the parties and agreed upon by both parties. 
In addition the Court finds, based upon the testimony of 
Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the children's 
welfare that the Plaintiff not work full-time so that she 
can be available to the children when they come home from 
school. The Court further believes, that based upon the 
finances of the parties that the parties can afford this 
arrangement. 
(R. 1637-38) . 
By the same token, Dr. Bova presented no evidence demon-
strating that Ms. Melle could locate and be hired for a full-time 
job as a nurse paralegal in which she would be able to leave work 
in time to be home when the children returned from school. There 
is also no indication that Ms. Melle could obtain a job as a 
registered nurse; Ms. Melle's nursing license has lapsed, and in 
order to renew her license, she would have to enroll in a 
re-certification program at the University of Utah. (R. 2141). 
Furthermore, Ms. Melle earns more as a nurse paralegal than she 
would as a clinical nurse. (R. 2142-43). 
4. IN DIVIDING PROCEEDS OF THE PARTIES' INDIVIDUAL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ("IRA"), THE TRIAL COURT CON-
SIDERED DR. BOVA'S WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS IN VIOLATION 
OF ITS ORDER BUT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE INCOME TAX 
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS IMPROPER WITHDRAWAL ON 
MS. MELLE. 
The parties maintained an IRA during the marriage that 
contained $75,000 at the time of the parties' separation. 
(R. 1642). Within two weeks after Ms. Melle filed her complaint 
for divorce, the trial court ordered the parties not to dissipate 
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the marital assets without the court's prior permission. (R. 
2309) . 
Despite the court's order and without its permission, Dr. Bova 
subsequently withdrew and spent $57,018.26 from the IRA. (Defen-
dant's Exhibit 28; R. 1642, 2439). Dr. Bova claimed that he used 
this amount, among other things, to pay state and federal taxes in 
the amount of $22,960; to purchase a dining room set for $3,200 for 
his new residence; and to give his daughter from his prior marriage 
$5,000 in college expenses. (Defendant's Exhibit 28). Signifi-
cantly, Dr. Bova has been unable to produce receipts or other 
documentation evidencing his purchases and payments even though it 
is his practice to try to keep records of purchases over $1,000. 
(R. 2311-13). Based on the lack of evidence beyond Dr. Bova's 
self-serving claim that he withdrew and used the $57,018.26 for the 
benefit of both parties, the court concluded that the withdrawal 
was improper. (R. 1642). Dr. Bova also withdrew approximately 
$5,000 for an unknown purpose and does not contend that this amount 
was used to both parties' benefit. (R. 2308). The court also 
found this withdrawal to be improper, bringing the total withdrawal 
amount from the IRA considered to be improper and for the benefit 
of Dr. Bova alone to $62,100. (R. 1642). 
On the other hand, Dr. Bova properly withdrew $12,900 from the 
IRA after the divorce action commenced upon obtaining the court's 
permission. (R. 1642). From this amount, $6,000 was used to pay 
a portion of the each party's attorney fees; $3,000 was used to pay 
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the custodial evaluator, Dr. Stewart; and $3,900 was used allegedly 
to pay medical bills related to his suicide attempt and cosmetic 
surgery, although Dr. Bova was unable to produce these bills. (R. 
1642) . 
Because Dr. Bova improperly withdrew $62,100 from the IRA, the 
court determined he should be required to pay the tax penalty for 
this withdrawal in the amount of $6,210. (R. 1642-43). Regarding 
the $12,900 Dr. Bova properly withdrew, the Court estimated the 
penalty for withdrawal to be $1,290 and ordered the parties to 
split this penalty equally. (R. 1642). 
Ms. Melle had already filed her 1994 state and federal income 
tax returns by the time of trial. However, the court ordered the 
parties to file joint returns for 1994 that included the $75,000 
IRA amount as income, finding that "the parties will save money on 
federal and state taxes if they are required to file jointly for 
tax year 1994." (R. 1642). The court found that the income tax 
owed due to the inclusion of the IRA withdrawal as income would be 
approximately $16,000 and ordered the parties to pay the 1994 taxes 
equally. (R. 1662) . 
5. THE BALANCE OF A HOME EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT USED 
FOR DR. BOVA'S BENEFIT WAS CHARGED TO HIM. 
During the marriage Dr. Bova took out a Home Equity Line of 
Credit ("HELC") against the parties' marital residence in his name. 
(R. 1641) . When the parties separated in August 1994, the HELC had 
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a balance of approximately $18,000 ; at the time of trial, it had 
a balance of approximately $24,000. (R. 1641). Dr. Bova used the 
HELC for his own purposes, including purchasing Sea Doos watercraft 
for $12,500 in 1993. (R. 1641, 1644-45). Although Ms. Melle made 
it clear to Dr. Bova that she did not approve of this purchase, he 
purchased the watercraft anyway. (R. 2175) . He additionally used 
the HELC in 1993 to pay for attorney fees in the amount of $3,000 
without Ms. Melle's knowledge. (R. 2176, 2177). 
Dr. Bova used the remainder of the HELC to pay some of his 
temporary court-ordered alimony obligations. (R. 1641). The trial 
court found that this portion of the HELC also benefited Dr. Bova 
alone rather than both parties: 
[A] substantial portion of that amount of the line of 
credit that exceeds $18,000 was incurred by the defendant 
to make mortgage payments and temporary alimony payments 
as ordered by the court. To allow those amount [sic] to 
be deducted from the sales proceeds of the home prior to 
the division of equity would have the effect of requiring 
the plaintiff to pay one half of the temporary alimony 
and support awarded to her. This, of course, would be 
unfair. 
(R. 1361). Accordingly, Judge Noel ruled that Dr. Bova should pay 
the entire balance of the HELC. (R. 1641). 
4 
Dr. Bova maintains the balance was actually $14,000 and that 
Judge Noel's "confusion" in this regard is tantamount to error. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27) . If the trial court indeed was 
incorrect, this "error" is not prejudicial. Whatever the balance 
was, Dr. Bova failed to present any evidence that any portion of 
the HELC was used for anything other than his own purposes. The 
legal ramification of this, that Dr. Bova must assume the whole 
balance of the HELC, remains unaffected. 
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6. THE TRIAL COURT EQUALLY SPLIT THE EQUITY IN THE 
MARITAL RESIDENCE. 
The parties acquired a marital residence in Park City that was 
valued at $385,000, with equity of $208,835 at the time of trial. 
(R. 1641, 1661). Judge Noel awarded possession of the home to Ms. 
Melle and ordered that Dr. Bova make the monthly mortgage payment 
of $1,789 until the house was sold or refinanced by Ms. Melle. (R. 
1662). Dr. Bova receives a credit of $1,789 against his monthly 
combined child support and alimony obligation of $2,600 in exchange 
for paying the mortgage. (R. 1662). 
The court divided home equity equally between the parties, 
subject to offsets in Dr. Bova's share of the equity. From 
Dr. Bova's share of $104,417.50, the trial court determined that 
the following amounts should be deducted: $29,597, representing Ms. 
Melle's share of an IRA account maintained during the marriage; 
$15,000, representing the amount of Ms. Melle's attorney fees Judge 
Noel ordered Dr. Bova to pay; and Dr. Bova's share of the parties' 
1994 income taxes, including most of a $7,500 tax incurred because 
Dr. Bova withdrew funds from the IRA early and in violation of a 
previous court order. (R. 1643-44). 
7. THE COURT EQUITABLY SPLIT THE MARITAL PROPERTY. 
Judge Noel awarded Dr. Bova the following items of property: 
Household items 
(deducting value of Sea Doos) $11,050 
1992 Subaru SVX $ 2,825 
Zions Checking Account $ 250 
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IRA Withdrawal $75,0005 
Total $89r725 
(R. 1645). In arriving at a value for the household items awarded 
to Dr. Bova, Judge Noel relied on an appraisal of all marital 
property in his possession performed by Family Affairs, an 
independent appraisal company, which valued the property at 
$18,770. (Defendant's Exhibit 25). From this amount, Judge Noel 
deducted $7,500, which was the value of the Sea Doos at the time of 
trial, rather than the purchase price of the Sea Doos, which was 
$12,500. (R. 1645). 
The following items were awarded to Ms. Melle: 
Household items $14,636 
1994 Subaru $ 1,795 
Feb. 1995 pension distributions $ 1,200 
Total $17,631 
(R. 1645). 
To compensate partially for the fact that Dr. Bova was awarded 
$72,094 more in property than Ms. Melle, the court awarded her 
$29,597 as her share of the IRA, which amount the court directed to 
be deducted from Dr. Bova's share of equity in the marital 
residence. (R. 1645). 
5 
Including $12,900 Dr. Bova withdrew with the court's permis-
sion to pay the $3,000 fee of the custodial evaluator, $3,000 in 
attorney fees to each party's attorney, and $3,900 allegedly for 
medical bills. Dr. Bova was unable to produce any of these bills, 
but he testified that a portion of the bills was used to pay for 
medical care received during his suicide attempt and cosmetic 
surgery. 
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8. THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE 
CHILDREN TO MS. MELLE AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT AND 
GAVE DR. BOVA THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE THE EXEMPTIONS 
FROM MS. MELLE. 
Regarding the disposition of the income tax exemptions claimed 
for dependents, the court ruled: 
The tax exemptions for the minor children shall be 
awarded to the Plaintiff; however, if it should appear 
that the Defendant may gain greater tax advantage by 
claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, 
the Defendant shall be entitled to "purchase" the tax 
exemptions from Plaintiff. The purchase price shall be 
the difference in taxes owing if the Plaintiff uses the 
exemption and that amount of taxes owing if she does not 
use the exemption. 
(R. 1665). 
9. THE COURT AWARDED MS. MELLE $15,000 IN ATTORNEY 
FEES INCURRED IN THE DIVORCE BASED ON NEED. 
Judge Noel granted Ms. Melle's request that Dr. Bova be 
required to pay at least a portion of attorney fees she incurred in 
this action on the ground of need, stating: 
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far 
in excess of that income earned by the Plaintiff. The 
Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course 
of these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his 
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in 
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living 
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter 
of that earned by the Defendant and that all of the 
Plaintiff s monthly income is used to pay for necessary 
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does 
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she 
has paid her monthly living expenses. (R. 1647). 
Indeed, Dr. Bova expended $24,573.09 in attorney fees and 
costs by the time of trial. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). Speci-
fically, he expended $8,698 in fees and costs before this action 
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commenced, to Craig Peterson and Sandy Dolowitz. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 37). He initially retained Mary Corporon to represent him 
in this action, and incurred fees and costs from her of $4,167.13. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). He then retained the services of Helen 
Christian beginning in November 1994, who charged a total of 
$5,090.54. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). Finally, Ken Okasaki became 
his attorney in June 1995 and had charged a total of $6,617.42 by 
August 1995. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 37).6 
In stark contrast, the trial court awarded only $15,036 in 
attorney fees to Ms. Melle. (R. 1645). Dr. Bova's counsel 
stipulated that the attorney fees charged by Evelyn Saunders, who 
represented Ms. Melle at trial, were related to the work performed 
and did not argue that the amount of fees incurred by Ms. Melle was 
unreasonable. (R. 2451). The court also viewed this amount as 
necessary and reasonable, pointing out that 
the Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five 
motions made by the Defendant to lower his child support 
and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each 
time the by Court; and that the Plaintiff was forced to 
incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to 
compel to obtain information regarding the Defendant's 
financial records. 
(R. 1647). 
By the time Dr. Bova commenced this appeal, he switched 
attorneys to Ann Wassermann. (Notice of Appeal dated October 15, 
1996). He finally settled on his current counsel in May 1997. 
(Substitution of Counsel dated May 8, 1997) . 
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10. JUDGE NOEL DENIED MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF DIS-
SIPATION OF MARITAL ASSETS. 
At trial, Dr. Bova revealed that he had set up a trust for his 
daughter from his previous marriage in the amount of $16,000. (R. 
2551) . Dr. Bova claimed that Ms. Melle knew of this trust and when 
it was created and that he did not deposit any money in the trust 
after the parties separated. (R. 2551, 2561). However, Ms. Melle 
testified she was not aware until trial that Dr. Bova had created 
a trust for his daughter and was not aware that the balance in that 
trust was $16,000. (R. 2563-64). 
In January 1996, several months before Judge Noel issued his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Ms. Melle moved for a new 
trial based upon newly-discovered evidence that Dr. Bova had 
dissipated marital assets. (R. 1186-1190). Before trial com-
menced, Ms. Melle sent interrogatory requests to Dr. Bova asking 
him to list all accounts in his name. (R. 1179). He failed to 
list any trust account for any of his children, including his 
daughter. (R. 1179-1180). After the trial, Ms. Melle was cleaning 
out the desk Dr. Bova used when the parties were married in the 
marital home and discovered a financial statement from Strong 
Discovery Fund relating to the trust for Dr. Bova's daughter. 
(R. 1180-81). Although Dr. Bova received other financial state-
ments addressed to the parties' marital residence, these statements 
had been mailed to a private post office box in Park City in 
Dr. Bova's name. (R. 1180). According to the financial statement, 
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the value of the daughter's account as of June 1994, just prior to 
the parties' separation, was $3,232,24. (R. 1181, 1183). Thus, 
Dr. Bova deposited $13,000 into the trust account after the parties 
were separated. (R. 1181). Ms. Melle requested a new trial to 
determine if Dr. Bova had in fact dissipated marital assets and, if 
so, to seek a credit in the amount of one-half of the marital funds 
improperly diverted. (R. 1181) . 
The court denied Ms. Melle's motion, stating without explana-
tion that she could have discovered information regarding when the 
bulk of funds was deposited into the trust account before trial. 
(R. 1855) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS RELATING TO DR. BOVA'S APPEAL 
POINT I: The trial court acted within its discretion in 
calculating Ms. Melle's monthly income for child support and 
alimony purposes based on her current salary and her historical 
status as a part-time employee. The trial court was not obliged to 
accept Dr. Bova's position that her income should be determined 
based on what she might earn as a full-time worker, particularly 
when he presented no evidence that she should work full-time or 
that she would be able to find a full-time job paying more than 
what she currently earns as a part-time nurse paralegal. 
POINT II: The trial court divided the marital property in an 
equitable manner. It split the equity in the marital residence in 
half, then made appropriate deductions from Dr. Bova's half for 
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amounts owing to Ms. Melle for attorney fees and her share of an 
IRA, and for amounts owing in income taxes. It divided the 
personal property fairly, awarding each party the value of property 
in his or her possession and giving Ms. Melle her share of the 
funds withdrawn from the IRA by Dr. Bova. 
POINT III: The trial court properly assessed to Dr. Bova the 
debt on a home equity line of credit he took out and used for his 
benefit. 
POINT IV: The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 eliminates capital 
gains tax on sales of primary personal residences up to $250,000. 
Dr. Bova's claim that capital gains tax on the residence was 
handled improperly is moot. Even if it was not moot, the trial 
court cannot be expected to rule on tax matters that are purely 
speculative. 
POINT V: It was proper for the trial court to award the tax 
dependency exemptions for the parties' minor children to Ms. Melle, 
the custodial parent. There is a legal presumption in favor of 
awarding this exemption to the custodial parent, and Dr. Bova 
presented no evidence to the trial court to rebut this presumption. 
Any error by the trial court in this regard would not be preju-
dicial, as the trial court's ruling affords Dr. Bova the 
opportunity to purchase the exemptions from Ms. Melle. 
POINT VI; The trial court's award of $15,000 in attorney fees 
to Ms. Melle was reasonable in light of Ms. Melle' s need and the 
small amount of fees incurred compared to those incurred by 
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Dr. Bova. Dr. Bova has certainly not had trouble paying his own 
attorney fees in this past, and this obligation should pose no 
financial hardship for him. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MS. MELLE'S CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT VII; The trial court erred in failing to consider Dr. 
Bova's income from his second job when arriving at a monthly income 
in determining the alimony and child support awards. Taking his 
total employment income into account more accurately reflects his 
ability to pay alimony and child support. When weighed against Ms. 
Melle's need for further support and her inability to earn more 
income, consideration of income from his second job becomes parti-
cularly justified. 
POINT VIII: In computing Dr. Bova's monthly child support 
obligation, the trial court should have extrapolated beyond the 
highest combined income figure listed in the Utah Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines. One of the guiding principles in assessing 
child support is to maintain the children in a standard of living 
that approximates as nearly as possible the standard of living 
during their parents' marriage. The court ignored this principle, 
but the children's needs warrant an award of higher child support 
award. 
POINT IX: The trial court erred in requiring Ms. Melle to 
file a joint tax return for 1994 that required her to bear the 
burden of income tax on the $75,000 IRA withdrawal. 
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POINT X: Ms. Melle was unaware until the trial in this matter 
that Dr. Bova had created a trust account for his daughter from a 
prior marriage and was depositing marital assets into it. She only 
learned after the trial that he had deposited most of the current 
balance in this trust account after the parties had separated. 
Because Dr. Bova improperly diverted marital assets and concealed 
his actions, the trial court should have granted her request for a 
new trial on this issue. 
POINT XI: Ms. Melle requests that she be awarded attorney 
fees incurred on appeal due to her inability to pay these fees. 
ARGUMENT ON APPELLANT'S ISSUES 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
DECLINING TO IMPUTE INCOME FROM A FULL-TIME 
JOB IN SOME UNKNOWN AMOUNT TO MS. MELLE IN 
CALCULATING DR. BOVA'S CHILD SUPPORT AND 
ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS. 
Judge Noel determined Ms. Melle's monthly income from her 
employment as a nurse paralegal for purposes of computing alimony 
and child support by multiplying her hourly wage by the maximum 
amount of hours she works in any given week. Using the maximum 
number of hours she works in a week overinflates her actual income, 
but Ms. Melle accepts the monthly income amount arrived at by the 
trial court, $2,386, for purposes of this appeal. 
During the entirety of the parties' marriage, Ms. Melle never 
worked full-time because the parties agreed that their children 
should have a parent with them as much as possible and that she 
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should be that parent. While she has worked as a nurse paralegal 
she has always arranged her work schedule so she can be home when 
the children return from school. She continues to do so today, in 
accordance with the recommendation of custodial evaluator 
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart that it is in the children's best interests 
and within the financial means of the parties to have a parent at 
home for the children in the afternoon. 
Although he acknowledges that Ms. Melle should be home for the 
children when they return from school, Dr. Bova contends that she 
can work full-time at her present job and leave work each day in 
time to be home for the children in the afternoons. Dr. Bova 
concocted a work schedule for Ms. Melle calling for her to go to 
work four weekend days each month and a couple of full weekdays 
each month when the children are visiting Dr. Bova, and to work a 
full day each week during the summer. (Brief of Appellant, p. 34). 
Basically, this schedule assumes Ms. Melle will be working whenever 
Dr. Bova has the children for visitation. This schedule also 
assumes Kipp & Christian will permit Ms. Melle to work whenever 
Dr. Bova wants her to work, even weekends, when Kipp & Christian 
is not open for business. 
7 
Dr. Bova attempts to turn Ms. Melle's testimony that she has 
a "flexible schedule" with Kipp & Christian into an admission that 
she can come and go as she pleases, no matter what time of the day 
or how many hours she works in a given day. Ms. Melle testified 
that her schedule requires her to work twenty hours each week, but 
that she could not load these hours into two days of ten hours per 
day. (R. 2470). Rather, she must work "regularly," putting in 
about an equal amount of hours each day to reach twenty hours. (R. 
2470). There is no evidence that she can work when Dr. Bova 
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Most importantly, Dr. Bova assumes in creating a full-time 
work schedule for Ms. Melle that Kipp & Christian needs a full-time 
nurse paralegal and would allow her to work as a full-time nurse 
paralegal. He does not offer any evidence, as he cannot, to 
support these assumptions. 
Dr. Bova complains that the trial court should have imputed 
full-time work income to Ms. Melle, yet he does not demonstrate 
that she has the ability to work full-time. There is no evidence 
that Kipp & Christian would hire her full-time and no evidence of 
o 
what it would pay her if it did hire her full-time. There is no 
evidence she could juggle a second part-time job and still be home 
when the children return from school. Ms. Melle tried to work a 
second part-time job while she was with Kipp & Christian, but it 
proved to be unworkable because she had problems with overlapping 
schedules. Finally, there is no evidence that she could find a 
full-time job as a nurse paralegal, as a nurse, or as something 
else that would increase her monthly earnings and allow her to be 
home in time for the childrens' return from school. 
would like her to, nor is there evidence that Kipp & Christian 
would agree with Dr. Bova's unsubstantiated assumption that she 
would be allowed to work forty hours a week. 
o 
One cannot assume that Kipp & Christian would pay her $18.50 
per hour, her rate of pay for twenty hours per week, if she worked 
forty hours per week. In fact, it is likely that her hourly wage 
would decrease for a forty-hour work week, since the law firm would 
be required to provide her with costly benefits to which full-time 
employees are entitled. 
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Had the trial court accepted Dr. Bova's argument that full-
time income should be imputed to Ms. Melle, it would have been 
engaging in pure conjecture. It properly declined to do so. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE MARITAL 
PROPERTY. 
In distributing assets of the marital estate, "there is no 
fixed rule or formula. . . . The trial court may make such orders 
in relation to the parties as may be equitable." Burnham v. 
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). The trial court acted 
within its broad discretion in dividing the marital property. 
The equity in the parties' marital residence of $208,835 was 
apportioned equally to the parties. While Judge Noel ordered that 
certain deductions be made from Dr. Bova's half of the equity, 
these deductions were reasonable and necessary. First, the trial 
court determined that Ms. Melle was entitled to a share of the IRA, 
a marital asset, in the amount of $29,597, and that this should be 
deducted from Dr. Bova's share of the home equity. The trial court 
also determined that $15,000 should be deducted to cover Ms. 
Melle's reasonable and necessary attorney fees, and that his share 
of the parties' 1994 income taxes should be deducted. 
The trial court also split the parties' remaining property as 
equitably as possible. Dr. Bova was awarded $89,725 in personal 
property, while Ms. Melle received only $17,631. Even taking into 
account the court's award of $29,597 to Ms. Melle as her share of 
the IRA, which increases the value of property awarded to her to 
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$48,228 and decreases the value of property awarded to Dr. Bova to 
$60,128, the disparity in Dr. Bova's favor remains. 
In spite of this, Dr. Bova views the property distribution as 
unfair. While he agrees the trial court was correct in refusing to 
treat the Sea Doos as marital property and thus deducted the Sea 
Doos from the value of household items awarded to him, he maintains 
the trial court used an incorrect figure. Dr. Bova purchased the 
Sea Doos for $12,500, but the independent appraiser placed their 
value at the time of trial at $7,500. The court deducted this 
latter figure, rather than the purchase price, in reaching a total 
of $11,050 in household items awarded to Dr. Bova. The independent 
appraiser determined the value of the household items awarded by 
relying on the value of each item, rather than the purchase price. 
The appraiser placed the total value of Dr. Bova's household items 
at $18,770, and the Sea Doos constituted $7,500 of this amount. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 25). Had the trial court deducted the 
purchase price of the Sea Doos from the $18,770, the result would 
have been to undervalue the remaining items, which would have 
worked an unfairness upon Ms. Melle. 
Dr. Bova also faults the trial court for including his house-
hold items (minus the Sea Doos) in the property division when he 
allegedly bought these items with the IRA funds he improperly 
withdrew. Since the full value of the $75,000 IRA is also included 
in the property division, Dr. Bova complains he is being "double-
assessed" for his household items. Dr. Bova ignores the fact that 
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there is no proof he purchased these items with the IRA proceeds. 
Even if he could produce documentation tracing the funds for these 
items to the IRA, he is not being double-assessed for the personal 
property. The difference between what he paid for each household 
item and what the appraiser values each item at for property 
division purposes is substantial. For instance, whereas Dr. Bova 
testified he purchased a dining room set for $3,200, the appraiser 
gave it a value of only $750. Given the timing of the purchase and 
the source of purchase funds, the depreciation of these items has 
to be assessed to their owner, Dr. Bova. 
Third, he asserts that the trial court overvalued the IRA 
awarded to him at $75,000 when he allegedly did not receive the 
benefit of all of the proceeds. While it is true that $12,900 from 
the IRA was used to pay marital debts, the trial court ultimately 
took this into account in dividing marital assets. Rather than 
awarding Ms. Melle home equity equal to fifty percent of the IRA 
funds, the trial court awarded her $29,597, or fifty per cent "less 
one half of the $12,900 representing the portion . . . the Court 
allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both 
parties." (R. 1643-44). 
The $12,900 withdrawal is the only legal withdrawal Dr. Bova 
made on the IRA. He withdrew the remaining $62,100 in violation of 
the court's order against dissipating marital assets. Ironically, 
he has produced no documentation to support his claim that he used 
some of the illegally-withdrawn IRA funds to pay state and federal 
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taxes to the benefit of both parties, yet he would have had such 
documentation if the funds had been withdrawn with the court's 
permission because the court would have overseen the withdrawal. 
His bare assertion that he used the illegally-withdrawn funds for 
the parties' benefit was properly disregarded by the trial court in 
dividing the IRA proceeds between the parties. In Painter v. 
Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988), a husband withdrew funds 
from a retirement account in violation of a court's restraining 
order prohibiting the parties from disposing of any marital 
property. In its property distribution, the court credited one-
half of the original amount of the fund to the wife. The husband 
appealed this decision, asserting that he used some of the funds he 
had withdrawn to pay loans that benefited the wife, as well. 
However, the husband failed to present any documentation supporting 
his assertion, and the court of appeals determined the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in disbelieving the husband's 
assertion. See also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) (one 
half of value of marital property corporation awarded to wife 
despite husband's allegation that corporation was encumbered by a 
loan made by his pre-marital company; husband failed to carry 
burden of proof on existence of loan because he produced no papers 
documenting loan). 
Dr. Bova cannot show that the property division amounted to a 
NVserious inequity" against him resulting in "substantial and 
prejudicial error." Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978). 
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Instead, he was awarded more than half the value of the marital 
property. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ASSESSING THE HELC DEBT TO DR. BOVA. 
Dr. Bova's suggestion that "the burden of the HELC must be 
equally shared between the parties'' (Brief of Appellant, p. 30) is 
insupportable in view of the fact that the benefits of the HELC 
were not shared equally by the parties. Dr. Bova used the HELC 
during the marriage to purchase the Sea Doos, of which he was 
awarded possession in the divorce decree, against the protests of 
Ms. Melle; and he drew on it to pay for his attorney fees without 
Ms. Melle's knowledge. 
Dr. Bova contends he was forced to use the remainder of the 
HELC balance to pay some of his temporary court-ordered alimony 
obligations and mortgage payments because he was financially 
destitute. Considering Dr. Bova's high income, his penchant for 
expensive vacations and ability to pay considerable attorney fees 
during the divorce proceedings, it is not surprising that Dr. Bova 
fails to explain how it was that his adjusted gross monthly income 
of over $9,000 could not cover the temporary support payments. At 
any rate, had the court required Ms. Melle to assume debt that had 
been incurred to pay her alimony and mortgage payments, she would 
have effectively been paying for half of her own spousal support, 
which would have been an unfair result. 
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Finally, Dr. Bova points out that the amount of temporary 
spousal support he paid each month during the divorce proceedings 
was higher than the permanent spousal support awarded by the court 
in the Decree of Divorce. He argues that Ms. Melle was thus 
overpaid in temporary spousal support and should have to assume a 
portion of the HELC debt in an amount equal to this overpayment. 
Retroactive reduction of a spousal support payment is discre-
tionary, and the court acted within its discretion in refusing to 
make Ms. Melle, whose monthly income is one quarter that of 
Dr. Bova's, pay back money she had already spent. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992). Moreover, there is no 
indication that Dr. Bova ever petitioned for a retroactive 
adjustment in alimony after his permanent alimony obligation was 
set by the trial court, and he is barred from asking for such 
relief on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO RULE ON A 
TAX ISSUE THAT WAS SPECULATIVE AND WAS NOT 
PROPERLY RAISED. 
In its minute entry following trial, the court awarded 
possession of the marital residence to Ms. Melle and allowed her 
the option of refinancing the home or selling it. The court did 
not include a ruling on who would bear any capital gains tax if the 
house was ultimately sold for more than its basis. Commenting on 
the court's minute entry, Dr. Bova did not mention capital gains 
taxes, but vaguely spoke of capital gains: 
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The Court has also failed to consider the capital gains 
consequences. The capital gains should be divided 
equally or prorated based upon who derives the most 
profit from the sale of the house. (R. 1232). 
If Dr. Bova was intending by this confusing statement to ask the 
Court for a ruling on who would pay any capital gains tax on the 
sale of the home, he did not make his intention clear enough to 
qualify as a preservation of this issue for appeal. The mere 
mention of error before the trial court, without giving the court 
an explanation for why something constitutes error, is insufficient 
to preserve an issue for appeal. Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360 
(Utah App. 1996) . 
At any rate, the federal tax law on capital gains was recently 
changed in such a way to render Dr. Bova's argument moot. He 
claims that the home's tax basis is $265,000 and that the home 
would sell for its appraised value of $385,00, resulting in a capi-
tal gain of $120,000. Under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, § 
312(a), effective for capital gains incurred after May 1997, there 
is an exemption from tax for gain on the sale of a home resulting 
9 
in a capital gain of less than $250,000. 
Additionally, the trial court was under no obligation to 
consider speculative future tax consequences associated with the 
sale of marital property. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
App. 1990). The house has not yet been sold. There is no evidence 
of what the home's basis is, beyond Dr. Bova's undocumented 
assertion that it is $265,000, and no evidence of what the purchase 
price of the home, since there is no buyer yet. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE TAX DEPENDENCY 
EXEMPTIONS TO MS. MELLE AS THE CUSTODIAL 
PARENT. 
Judge Noel awarded the tax exemptions for the parties' minor 
children to Ms. Melle, subject to Dr. Bova's right to purchase them 
by paying her the amount of tax benefit she would receive if she 
claimed them. 
The trial court's ruling does not preclude Dr. Bova from 
claiming the children as dependency exemptions; if he would receive 
a greater tax advantage than Ms. Melle, he can purchase the exemp-
tions from her. The trial court's position on the exemptions 
comports with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.21 (1994), allowing the 
court to consider, among other things, the relative tax benefit to 
each party. Judge Noel was not required to explain the denial of 
Dr. Bova's request for the exemptions. The trial court acted 
within its discretion in awarding the exemptions to the parent with 
whom the children reside, and in allocating the tax benefit to the 
parents on the basis of value. Dr. Bova has not been prejudiced by 
the court's ruling. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO MS. 
MELLE IN VIEW OF HER NEED AND DR. BOVA'S 
ABILITY TO PAY WAS WARRANTED. 
Ms. Melle testified that Dr. Bova vowed when she filed for 
divorce that he would rather "give all his money to the attorneys 
than give her a cent." (R. 1960). Six attorneys and well over 
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$24,000 in legal fees later, Dr. Bova should be accustomed to 
paying attorneys for legal services rendered. Nonetheless, he 
balks at the trial court's order that he pay $15,000 in legal fees 
incurred on behalf of Ms. Melle, claiming he lacks ability to pay 
the fees and that inadequate findings were entered regarding Ms. 
Melle's need and the reasonableness of the fees. 
Dr. Bova's payment of tens of thousands of dollars to 
attorneys so far demonstrates his ability to pay Ms. Melle's fees. 
The court observed that while he has adequate resources to pay, 
Ms. Melle does not: 
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far 
in excess of that income earned by Plaintiff. The Court 
finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course of 
these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his 
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in 
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living 
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter 
of that earned by Defendant and that all of the 
Plaintiff's monthly income is used to pay for necessary 
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does 
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she 
has paid her monthly expenses. (R. 1647). 
The court further determined that the amount of fees incurred 
was reasonable because Ms. Melle was forced to defend five 
unsuccessful motions filed by Dr. Bova to decrease his child 
support and alimony obligation and was required to file motion to 
compel his production of financial records. (R. 1647). Obstrep-
erous behavior by the opposing party is another factor that may be 
examined in awarding attorney fees. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah App. 1988). Considering that Ms. Melle's attorney fees are 
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far less than Dr. Bova's, his counsel acted sensibly in failing to 
question the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded in the 
court below. He is precluded from questioning the reasonableness 
on appeal. 
The trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees 
based on need. Its decision to award her reasonable fees because 
she cannot afford to pay them was justified. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 
718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986) (award of attorney fees to wife proper 
where record showed evidence of need and reasonableness of fees) . 
ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE 
INCOME FROM DR. BOVA'S SECOND JOB IN COMPUTING 
HIS TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME FOR ALIMONY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT PURPOSES. 
The trial court relied on Dr. Bova's 1994 W-2 form from the 
Spine Center in finding his annual gross income to be $123,869, 
or $10,322 per month. (R. 1638). His monthly business expenses 
are $800 per month, bringing his adjusted gross monthly income to 
$9,583. (R. 1638). However, he only works twenty six hours per 
week at the Spine Center to earn this income. (R. 2294-95) 
It was undisputed at trial that Dr. Bova also began earning 
$1,000 per month reviewing files from the Utah Workers' 
Dr. Bova testified at trial that his annual income was 
$115,000 before business expenses, and he later maintained that his 
income in 1994 from the Spine Center was $109,124. (R. 1239). 
However, the court accurately relied on the 1994 W-2 form in 
finding that his income was $125,000. 
-34-
Compensation Fund in 1995. (R. 2299, 2301). The trial court did 
not add this amount to Dr. Bova's income from the Spine Center to 
arrive at a total income figure for purposes of calculating 
alimony, apparently on the ground that his income "prior to the 
filing of this matter" alone should be considered without 
considering any additional income earned afterwards. (R. 1638). 
This was an error; "the law require [s] that the trial court' 
consider [a party's] income from a second job. . . . " Breinholt v. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995). In Breinholt, the court 
of appeals reversed a trial court's award of alimony after the 
trial court had refused to consider the husband's income from a 
second job in calculating alimony on the mistaken belief that since 
Utah statute allows a court to consider only income from the 
equivalent of one full-time job in setting child support, that 
restriction must also exist with respect to alimony. The court of 
appeals corrected the trial court's legal error, emphasizing that 
it is appropriate and necessary for a trial court to 
consider all sources of income that were used by the 
parties during their marriage to meet their self-defined 
needs, from whatever source -- overtime, second job, 
self-employment, etc. . . . 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880, quoting Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 
686 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Dr. Bova's income from the Utah Workmen's Compensation Fund 
should also have been considered in computing his child support 
award. A party's "gross income" for purposes of calculating child 
support is defined as income from earned sources "limited to the 
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equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.5(2). Dr. Bova works twenty six hours per week at the Spine 
Center and approximately two hours per week for the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Fund. These combined amount to less than the equiva-
lent of one full-time 40-hour job. 
The alimony and child support awards should be adjusted upward 
to reflect Dr. Bova's income from the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Fund. An alimony and child support award should, to the extent 
possible, "equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living 
standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court 
acknowledged the disparity in the parties' income levels, noting 
that Dr. Bova's income is four times that of Ms. Melle's and that 
"all of her monthly income is used to pay for necessary living 
expenses." (R. 1647). Given this acknowledgment, it is puzzling 
that the trial court declined the opportunity to equalize the 
parties' post-divorce living standards by failing to include a 
fixed monthly income from Dr. Bova's second job in fixing alimony. 
Remand with instructions to recalculate alimony based on gross 
monthly income of $10,583 is warranted in order to achieve the 
principle behind spousal support. 
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POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED THE TAX 
BURDEN OF THE IRA FUNDS IMPROPERLY WITHDRAWN 
BY DR. BOVA TO MS. MELLE. 
The trial court ordered the parties to file joint 1994 income 
tax returns that included the $75,000 IRA withdrawal as income. 
The court acknowledged that a "substantial portion'' of the taxes 
incurred in 1994 were incurred as a result of Dr. Bova's decision 
to violate the court's order and withdraw funds from the IRA. (R. 
1642)
 0 The court estimated the tax owing by the parties if they 
filed jointly to be $16,000 and ordered the parties to bear this 
tax burden equally. (R. 1642-43). 
Requiring Ms. Melle to share in a tax burden created solely 
due to Dr. Bova's violation of a court order unfairly penalizes her 
for his actions. Dr. Bova should bear all consequences of his 
improper actions, including the tax consequences. The court 
imposed this extra tax burden on Ms. Melle during a period of 
particular financial hardship, after being required to change her 
lifestyle to support herself and two children on her part-time 
income, child support and alimony payments, and after expending 
several thousand dollars in attorney fees. Dr. Bova gave Ms. Melle 
no say in when the IRA funds were withdrawn and thus had no control 
over when she would incur a tax liability for the withdrawal. In 
fact, had the funds been withdrawn several years later, after more 
money had accumulated in the account to the benefit of both 
parties, it is speculative that she would have been required to pay 
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any tax on the withdrawal at all. Making her now share in the tax 
consequences of the withdrawal when she is in a poor financial 
situation is unfair. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXTRAPOLATED 
BEYOND THE CHILD SUPPORT TABLE TO CALCULATE 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
The parties' combined monthly adjusted gross income was 
determined by the court to be $11,969. The highest combined income 
listed on the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 is $10,100. The corresponding 
child support amount for two children is $1,400. The court set 
child support at $1,400, as if the parties' combined adjusted gross 
monthly income were only $10,100. 
The trial court declined to extrapolate beyond the Table and 
set child support reflecting the fact that the parties' combined 
adjusted gross income is actually $1,869 per month higher, despite 
Ms. Melle's urging. The trial court did not enter any findings 
revealing why it declined Ms. Melle's request. Utah law requires 
that in situations such as this, where the combined adjusted gross 
income exceeds the highest level specified in the Table, "an 
appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a 
case-by-case basis. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12. The trial 
court's failure to follow this edict constitutes error. 
Extrapolating beyond the Table to determine child support is 
justified in this case. One of the goals of child support is to 
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maintain the children in a standard of living as similar as 
possible to what they enjoyed during their parents' marriage. 
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). The parties' minor 
children were accustomed during the marriage to participating in 
numerous expensive sports activities, including skiing schools and 
basketball, that cost almost $300 per month. Such a unique expense 
for children is not accounted for as a monthly expense in the 
support figures listed in the Table. Child support should be 
recalculated by using the parents' actual combined adjusted gross 
monthly income so the children may maintain these activities. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT DR. BOVA 
DISSIPATED MARITAL ASSETS. 
Ms. Melle learned for the first time during trial that 
Dr. Bova had set up a trust for his daughter from a previous 
marriage in the amount of $16,000. Ms. Melle had asked Dr. Bova 
before trial through written discovery requests to identify all 
accounts in his name, but he failed to identify this trust fund in 
his responses, despite the fact that he is listed as custodian on 
the account. Dr. Bova testified at trial that he did not deposit 
any money in the trust account after the parties separated. 
However, a few months after trial, Ms. Melle was cleaning out 
the desk Dr. Bova had used at the parties' marital residence and 
discovered documents from Strong Discovery Fund suggesting that he 
had deposited the bulk of the $16,000 balance after the separation. 
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Ms. Melle immediately moved for a new trial in January 1996 on the 
basis of this newly-discovered evidence, arguing that the transfer 
of funds to his daughter's account after separation constituted an 
improper diversion of marital assets. The court issued its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in 
September 1996 and later denied Ms. Melle's motion for new trial. 
The court's Order simply stated: 
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for a new 
trial filed January 28, 1996 is denied on the basis that 
the Court believes the information upon which the Motion 
is based was available to Plaintiff through discovery 
prior to trial. 
(R. 1855) . 
Since the court offered no explanation for why it believed the 
information that Dr. Bova deposited most of the funds into the 
account after the parties' separation was available to Ms. Melle 
prior to trial, it is difficult to guess the basis for this belief. 
The evidence provided by Ms. Melle establishes that she sought 
information via pre-trial discovery about the existence of such 
accounts, that he failed to reveal the existence of this account 
until trial, that he falsely stated at trial he did not deposit any 
money into the account after the parties' separation, and that she 
"accidentally" found documentation after the trial showing a low 
account balance right before the parties' separation. The trial 
court erred in failing to explain its finding that she could have 
discovered the diversion of marital monies into the account before 
trial. There is more than ample evidence, on the other hand, to 
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support a finding that she could not discover this information 
despite due diligence until after trial. 
Dr. Bova's transfer of marital monies into his daughter's 
trust account after the parties separated was improper. Ms. Melle 
is not requesting that the monies be withdrawn from the fund and 
distributed to the parties; rather, she requests that she be given 
a credit for half of the monies that were deposited in the account 
after separation. A trial court can consider a party's improper 
"gift" of funds to a child in making an equitable distribution of 
the parties' remaining assets. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 
835 (Utah App. 1995). Ms. Melle requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court's denial of her Motion for New Trial and remand 
with instructions to conduct a new trial solely on the issues of 
whether marital monies were improperly deposited into the trust 
account and how this dissipation will affect the trial court's 
property distribution. 
POINT XI 
MS. MELLE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
The circumstances regarding Ms. Melle's inability to pay her 
attorney fees and Dr. Bova's capacity to cover her attorney fees 
have not changed now that this case is on appeal. "Generally, when 
fees in a divorce case are granted to the prevailing party at the 
trial court, and that party prevails on appeal, fees will also be 
awarded on appeal." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
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1991). Ms. Melle requests that this Court award her reasonable 
attorney fees incurred on appeal if she prevails. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Dr. Bova cannot present a compelling reason why the trial 
court's rulings with respect to Ms. Melle's income, property 
division, the HELC, any capital gains tax on the sale of the 
marital residence, tax dependency exemptions, and award of attorney 
fees to Ms. Melle constituted an abuse of discretion warranting 
this Court's reversal. Ms. Melle requests that this Court affirm 
the trial court's rulings on these issues. 
Ms. Melle asks on cross-appeal that certain of the trial 
court's rulings on other issues be modified. In setting alimony 
obligations, the trial court refused to consider income Dr. Bova 
earns from a second job in calculating his total monthly income. 
Ms. Melle requests that the issue of alimony be remanded with 
instructions that the trial court reset alimony after taking into 
account income earned from Dr. Bova's second job. The trial court 
also erred in setting child support obligations by failing to 
extrapolate from the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table 
to calculate child support, and this Court should reverse the award 
of child support. Since the recalculation of child support by 
extrapolating involves the parties' set income figures and the 
fixed numbers in the Table, Ms. Melle suggests that the matter of 
recalculating child support is within this Court's power (Ms. Melle 
has already recalculated child support in footnote 3 of this brief) 
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and that remand is not necessary on this issue. Third, the trial 
court committed error in assessing half of the income tax 
attributable to the IRA withdrawal to her. Ms. Melle requests that 
Dr. Bova be required to pay the entire tax attributable to the IRA 
withdrawal. Fourth, the trial court should have granted 
Ms. Melle's Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence 
that Dr. Bova diverted marital assets into his daughter's trust 
account. Ms. Melle asks that this court remand on this issue with 
instructions that a trial be conducted solely on this subject. 
Finally, Ms. Melle asks that she be awarded reasonable attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this / ^  day of September, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R. Parker 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Evelyn L Saunders #2864 
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS it? * 0 ? : ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff SUMMIT COUNTY 
401 Main Street ^en-rburr.r.^jnty ~ 
PO Box 3418 B>'- — . _ _ fd\-
Park City, Utah 84060 Deputy ^ WK 
(801) 649-7496 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBORAH A MELLE, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs : 
CHARLES M BOVA, : Civil No 94-43-00105DA 
Defendant 
The above entitled matter came on for trial on October 24, 25, and 26, 1995 
before the above entitled Court, the Honorable Frank Noel, Judge, presiding Plaintiff was 
present and represented by counsel, Evelyn L Saunders Defendant was present and represented 
by counsel, Kenneth Okasaki During the trial, the parties reached a stipulation with respect to 
the custody of the minor children which stipulation was placed upon the record by the parties As 
to the remaining issues, the Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having heard 
testimony presented by the parties, having received exhibits on behalf of the parties and otherwise 
being fully informed in the premises took the matter under advisement The Court, at the 
conclusion of trial, invited the parties to submit comments to the Court upon receipt of the minute 
lU3o 
entry in order to address any items the parties felt that the Court may have inadvertently 
overlooked or wherein the Court may have made mathematical errors. The Court issued its 
decision by Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995. The parties subsequently submitted 
comments on the Court's Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995, which comments the Court 
took under consideration. The Court additionally heard from the parties at a scheduled hearing 
dated April 14, 1996 in response to various motions filed with the Court. A separate order was to 
be submitted with respect to said motions. The Court issued a second Minute Entry, dated April 
22, 1996 which addressed the comments of the parties that had been submitted to the Court in 
written form The Court does now, being fully informed, find as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were residents of Summit County, State of Utah for 
the three months immediately preceding the filing of this action. The Court finds it has 
jurisdiction in this matter. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married on June 
28, 1980 This is a 16 year marriage. 
3. During the course of the marriage, the Defendant engaged in numerous 
extramarital affairs which resulted in a break down of the marriage relationship. The parties 
attempted to reconcile their differences and sought counseling; however, the parties were 
unsuccessful in salvaging the marriage and Plaintiff filed for divorce. Defendant countersued the 
Plaintiff for divorce on the basis on irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that there are 
grounds upon which to award the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce based upon her complaint and to 
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award the Defendant a Decree of Divorce based upon his counterclaim. 
4. There are two children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Mikell Bova, 
born March 8, 1984, and Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987. 
5. During the course of the trial, the parties reached a stipulation regarding 
custody of the minor children. The parties stipulated as follows: The parties agreed to joint legal 
custody of the minor children; however, all decision making authority regarding the activities of 
the children, including, but not limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports 
activities, etc. would remain solely with the Plaintiff and she would have the final say with respect 
to all issues regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the 
parties agreed that since the Plaintiff is a registered nurse and the Defendant is a medical 
physician, that the Plaintiff would discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the 
Defendant to obtain his input but that the final decision-making authority regarding the children's 
medical care and related issues would remain with the Plaintiff. The parties should exchange 
information concerning the health, education and welfare of the children. 
The Court finds that the parties are unable, by their past interaction, to reach 
mutual agreement with respect to the children. Based thereon, the Court finds that the agreement 
entered into between the parties is in the best interests of the children and should be adopted by 
the Court. 
The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would have physical custody of the minor 
children and that the Defendant would have visitation with the children. 
Based upon the parties' stipulation and the findings as set forth herein, this Court 
finds that it is in the best interests of the parties' minor children that the Court adopt the parties' 
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agreement with respect to the physical custody of the children. 
The parties' agreement provides that the Defendant would be entitled to visitation 
as follows: The Defendant would have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of 
visitation on the alternating week schedule would be from Wednesday after school until Monday 
morning when the Defendant would return the children to school The second period of visitation 
on the alternating week visitation would be from Thursday after school until Monday morning 
when the Defendant returns the children to school 
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation would still alternate 
weekly as follows: The first period of visitation would commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. 
until Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant would 
have the children from Thursday at 1:00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. 
The parties agreed that the Defendant's visitation would not interfere with the 
children's pre-scheduled activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when 
school is not in session. 
The parties agreed that holiday and birthday visitation would be pursuant to U.C. 
A. 30-3-35. 
The parties agreed that the Defendant would be entitled to have the children for 
four weeks of visitation in the summer school vacation period. Further, the Defendant would be 
entitled to have the children for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period during his summer 
vacation visitation . The Defendant would be required to inform the Plaintiff by May 1 of each 
year as to the dates he intends to have the children for his summer visitation periods. The Court 
finds that the Defendant's proposed summer visitation should take precedence over the Plaintiffs 
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summer visitation as the Plaintiff has the children the majority of the time throughout the year. 
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for more than 21 days or more, the 
Defendant should be entitled to visit with the children on days 15, 16 and 17 or that 21-day 
period. 
In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14 days or more, the Plaintiff 
would be entitled to have the children returned to her for the time period as set forth hereinabove. 
The Court finds that the parties' agreement regarding visitation maximizes the amount of 
time that the children are able to spend with both parents; that the schedule permits the children to 
be transferred from the homes of the respective parties without the parties having to interact with 
one another and that given the past history of altercations that have occurred between the parties, 
that said visitation schedule will permit visitation to occur with minimal disruption to the 
emotional well being of the minor children. Based thereon, the Court finds it in the children's best 
interests to adopt the visitation agreement of the parties. 
6. The Plaintiff is a registered nurse who currently is employed on a part-time 
basis by Kipp and Christian as a nurse paralegal The Defendant is a physician, board certified in 
emergency medicine and certified in sports medicine. The Defendant is currently employed full 
time as a physician with the Spine Center. In addition, the Defendant, as an independent 
contractor, reviews medical case files for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. In said 
capacity, the Defendant works approximately four hours per week and charges $125.00 per hour. 
The Court finds that during the course of the marriage, the Plaintiff has always 
worked part-time since the birth of the children. Her part-time work schedule was discussed by 
the parties and agreed upon by both parties. In addition the Court finds, based upon the 
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testimony of Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the children's welfare that the Plaintiff not work 
full-time so that she can be available to the children when they come home from school. The 
Court further believes, that based upon the finances of the parties that the parties can afford this 
arrangement. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff works approximately 25 to 30 hours per week 
and that she earns an hourly wage of $18.50 which equals a gross salary of $2,386.00 per month 
before taxes. The Court calculates the Plaintiffs gross monthly income as follows: $18.50.hr. x 
30 hours/wk. x 4.3 weeks/mo.= $2,386.00. 
The Court finds the Defendant's gross monthly income to be $9,583.00 before 
taxes. The Court reviewed the Defendant's 1993 and 1994 income tax returns and his 1993 and 
1994 W-2 tax statements and determined that the Defendant's 1994 income as set forth on his 
W-2 form from the Spine Center is the best indicator of the Defendant's income prior to the filing 
of this matter. The Court further finds that Defendant's 1994 W-2 reflects his annual gross 
income to be $123,869.00 or $10,322.00 per month. The Court further finds that the Defendant 
has monthly business expenses which equal approximately $800.00 per month. The Court finds 
that after subtracting the Defendant's business expenses that he has an adjusted gross monthly 
income of $9,583.00 prior to taxes. 
7. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be paid child support by the 
Defendant based upon the parties' respective gross monthly incomes as determined hereinabove. 
The parties stipulated that irrespective of the amount of days per month that the defendant has the 
children for visitation that he would pay child support pursuant to the sole custody worksheet. 
The Court adopts the stipulation of the parties with respect to the child support and incorporates 
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said agreement herein. 
The Court finds that Defendant should be required to pay child support to the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.00 per month, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of the 
month and the balance on or before the 20th day of each month. A copy of the child support 
obligation worksheet is attached hereto and incorporated by this reference. 
8. The Court finds that pursuant to U.C. A. §78-45-7.16 that the Defendant 
should pay one-half of the Plaintiffs actual work-incurred day care costs and that it should be 
paid on or before the 1st day of each month. 
9. The Court finds that the Defendant has expenses equal to $8,145.00 which 
includes his obligation for child support, insurance and taxes as follows: 
Rent and Insurance 
Food and Household Supplies 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Laundry and Cleaning 
Clothing 
Life Insurance 
Child support(approximate) 
Entertainment 
Incidentals 
Auto payments 
Auto Expenses 
Installments 
Medical/Dental 
Taxes 
Medical Insurance 
Total 
$ 1,000.00 
400.00 
175.00 
75.00 
50.00 
150.00 
407.00 
1,400.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
120.00 
200.00 
150.00 
3,000.00 
150.00 
$ 8,045.00 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs net monthly income, after taxes and mandatory 
withholding is $1,800.00. The Court deducted 25% for taxes from her gross monthly pay to 
determine her net monthly pay. The Court has also taken into consideration that the Plaintiff will 
Iti8u 
receive child support as set forth hereinabove. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs monthly 
expenses are as follows: 
Mortgage 
Property Taxes 
Property Insurance 
Residence Maintenance 
Food and Household Supplies 
Utilities 
Telephone 
Laundry and cleaning 
Clothing 
Health Insurance 
Dental 
Entertainment 
Incidentals 
Auto payments 
Auto Expenses 
Children's Sports programs and equipment 
Taxes on alimony 
Installments 
Total 
$ 1,000.00 
200.00 
100.00 
200.00 
500.00 
250.00 
100.00 
50.00 
200.00 
400.00 
50.00 
250.00 
150.00 
350.00 
220.00 
200.00 
200.00 
175.00 
$4,595.00 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a need for alimony and that the Defendant has 
the ability to pay alimony to her. Based thereon, the Court finds that the Defendant should be 
obligated to pay the sum of $1,200.00 per month to the Plaintiff as alimony. The Court finds that 
the Defendant is paid once a month, usually by the 5th day of each month. Based thereon, the 
Court finds that alimony should be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of each month. 
Alimony payable to the Plaintiff should terminate upon the Plaintiffs cohabitation with a person 
of the opposite gender, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of the Divorce Decree 
herein, whichever event occurs first. 
10. The Court finds that the Defendant has a life insurance policy in effect. In 
determining the Defendant's monthly expenses hereinabove, the Court has computed the monthly 
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expenses associated with said life insurance policy. The Court finds it reasonable that the 
Defendant should be required to continue to pay for and maintain said a life insurance policy in an 
amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children with the Plaintiff as trustee of 
any proceeds. The Defendant should be required to provide proof of said insurance and 
designation of beneficiaries thereunder to the Plaintiff on or before January 5 of each year. 
11. The parties acquired a marital residence located at 7752 Boothill Drive, 
Park City, Utah. Although title of said real property is held in the name of the Defendant, the 
Court finds that it is a marital asset in which the parties each owns 50%, respectively, of the 
equity therein. The parties had a real property appraisal conducted and, based thereon, the parties 
stipulated that the value of said real property was $385,000.00. The parties fiirther stipulated that 
the first mortgage against said real property equals approximately $176,165.00. The parties also 
have a line of credit secured by said real property which had a balance of approximately 
$24,000.00 at time of trial. At the time the parties separated in August, 1994, the line of credit 
had a balance of approximately $18,000.00. The Court finds that approximately $18,000.00 of 
the line of credit was used by the Defendant for his own purposes such as attorney's fees and the 
purchase of Sea Doo water crafts for which he should be responsible, particularly in light of the 
fact that the Court is awarding the Defendant the full value of the Sea Doos without being 
charged against him as marital property as set forth hereinbelow. The Court also finds that the 
balance of the line of credit was incurred by the Defendant to pay his temporary Court ordered 
alimony obligations to the Plaintiff and Court ordered mortgage payments. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that the Defendant should be required to pay the entire balance of the home equity 
line of credit. 
9 
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Commencing December 15, 1995, until the marital home is either refinanced by the 
Plaintiff in her own name or the home is sold, the mortgage is to be paid by the Defendant and he 
should be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the monthly mortgage 
payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth hereinabove. The 
Defendant should be required to pay the monthly indebtedness associated with the line of credit 
until such time as Plaintiff refinances the residence or the residence is sold. 
12. The Court finds that the parties should be required to file joint 1994 
income tax returns since the parties resided together for a substantial portion of 1994. The Court 
further finds that a substantial portion of the taxes incurred in 1994 was incurred as a result of the 
Defendant withdrawing $75,000.00 from the parties' IRA and the Court is going to give the 
Plaintiff one half of the amount withdrawn as set forth hereinbelow. The Court finds that the 
parties will save money on federal and state taxes if they are required to file jointly for tax year 
1994. The Court finds that the taxes owing by the parties if they file jointly will be approximately 
$16,000.00 and, further, that a tax penalty of $7,500.00 will be assessed against the parties for 
the early withdrawal of the $75,000 00 from the parties' IRA in 1994. 
The Court finds that from the $75,000.00 withdrawn by the Defendant from the 
IRA that there was a previous Court order permitting the Defendant to withdraw $6,000 00 for 
the parties' attorney's fees, $3,000.00 for fees to Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and $3,900.00 for family 
medical bills which amounts total $12,900.00. It is equitable that the parties should be required to 
bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00 assessed on said amount which equals 645.00 
respectively. The Court finds that the withdrawal by the Defendant of the remaining $62,100.00 
from the IRA was improper and that he should be required to pay the penalty associated therewith 
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in the approximate sum of $6,210 00. 
The Court finds that there is sufficient equity in the marital home to pay said taxes 
if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home and, if the home is sold, that the taxes should be paid from 
the net proceeds The amounts owing as taxes for 1994 should be held in an escrow account and 
any amount not used to pay taxes should be divided equally between the parties The tax penalty 
of $7,500 00 should remain in the escrow account until paid 
There are outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family 
Affairs in the sum of $750 00, andDr Stewart in the sum of $2,069 40 Said debts plus interest 
thereon and any carrying charges incurred until paid should be paid from the sales proceeds of the 
home, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home The net proceeds after payment of said debts 
should be divided equally between the parties subject to certain offsets as set forth in paragraph 
12 hereinabove 
13 The Court ordered on April 18, 1996 that the Plaintiff has the option of 
refinancing the marital residence and keeping the marital residence The Court further found that 
if the Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital residence that she should be required to refinance the 
residence in her own name and bear the costs of refinancing No deductions should be allowed 
for realtor fees if the Plaintiff refinances the residence To determine the Defendant's equity in the 
marital residence, the mortgage of $176,165 00 should be deducted from the appraised value of 
$385,000 00 and the balance should be divided in half From the Defendant's share of the equity, 
the following amounts should be deducted the $29,597 00 awarded to the Plaintiff as her one half 
of the $75,000 00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant ($36,047 00 previously ordered less 
one half of the $12,900 00 representing the portion of the $75,000 00 the Court allowed to be 
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withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties); Plaintiffs attorney's fees equal to 
$15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set forth hereinabove; plus all of the 
$7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum of $645.00. 
14. The parties have divided their personal possessions between them except 
for the items addressed herein. The personal property in each party's possession was appraised by 
Family Affairs. The value of the personal property in the Plaintiffs possession is equal to 
$14,636.00 and the value of the personal property in the Defendant's possession equals 
$11,050.00. The parties stipulated to the appraised value and further stipulated that each party 
would be awarded those items in their respective possession. The Court adopts the parties' 
stipulation regarding the personal property distribution except for the following: the Defendant 
should deliver to Plaintiff the camera case, lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in 
her possession and she should be awarded the same; the Plaintiff should be awarded the Gorman 
lithograph; and the Plaintiff should deliver to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated 
with the Sea Doos, including the surfboard, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he should be 
awarded. 
The Court finds it equitable to award the Sea Doo water crafts to the Defendant as 
the Court has required the Defendant to pay the line of credit which was used to purchase the Sea 
Doos. 
The parties stipulated to the values of the vehicles in their possession. The value 
of the Plaintiffs vehicle, after deductions for amounts owing thereon, equals $1,795.00. The 
value of the Defendant's vehicle, after deductions for amounts owing thereon, is $2,825.00. 
The Court awards the Defendant the following marital assets: 
12 
l b 4 * 
Household Items 
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos) $ 11,050.00 
1992 Subaru SVX $ 2,825.00 
Zions Checking Account $ 250.00 
Zions Money Market Account $ 600.00 
IRA Withdrawal $ 75,000.00 
Total $ 89,725.00 
The Court awards the Plaintiff the following marital assets: 
Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00 
1994 Subaru $ 1,795.00 
Feb. '95 IRA distributions $ 1,200.00 
Total $ 17,631.00 
The difference between the amounts awarded to the respective parties is 
$72,094.00 which when divided in half is equal to $36,047.00. The Court finds that the 
Defendant owes to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00 (as set forth in paragraph 13 hereinabove) 
which will compensate the Plaintiff for the difference in the personal property award. Said 
amount will be deducted from the Defendant's share of the equity in the marital residence and will 
reimburse the Plaintiff for the difference in the values of the personal property awarded. 
15. The paries acquired the following retirement accounts and brokerage 
accounts: Prudential Securities valued at approximately $116,593.98; Brandywine valued at 
approximately $88,000.00; the Fidelity account valued at approximately $57,018.00 ; the Strong 
account valued at approximately $8,504.00, and the Mass Mutual account at $7,878.36. The 
approximate value of said accounts equals $277,994.34. The Court finds that said items are 
marital assets; that the values will fluctuate due to interest changes and asset values; however, the 
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Court finds that each party should be awarded one half of the value of said accounts as each 
account is valued at such time as the Decree of Divorce is entered herein. 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff presently carries health insurance which 
provides coverage for the parties' minor children. The Court finds that if the Defendant can 
obtain comparable coverage as that insurance carried by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he should able 
to do so and each party should share equally the out of pocket costs of the premium actually paid 
by the parent for the children's portion of the insurance. The children's portion of the premium 
should be a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children 
should be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children herein and dividing that portion 
attributable to the children by one-half The Court finds that the provisions as set forth in UCA 
78-45-7.15 should apply herein and said provisions should be incorporated herein by this 
reference Each party should share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical 
expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children. If one of the 
parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said party should be required to 
provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other party within thirty days of 
payment. 
17. The Court finds that the tax exemptions for the minor children should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff; however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax 
advantage by claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, it is reasonable that the 
Defendant should be entitled to "purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The Defendant 
may purchase the tax exemptions by paying the Plaintiff that amount she would save on her taxes 
by claiming the children. 
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18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff knew of the trust accounts held in the 
children's names, including the trust for Melissa Bova. The Court finds that said amounts in trust 
should not be returned as marital assets, but should remain as trusts for the benefit of the children 
as now established. 
19. The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far in excess of that 
income earned by the Plaintiff. The Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course of 
these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and 
that in addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living expenses. On the other hand, the Court 
finds that the Plaintiffs income per month is approximately one quarter of that earned by the 
Defendant and that all of the Plaintiffs monthly income is used to pay for necessary living 
expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees 
after she has paid her monthly expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's 
fees in this matter with a balance owing thereon, prior to trial, of $15,036.00 and that she has 
incurred additional attorney's fees and costs for three day of trial; that the attorney's fees and 
costs incurred by the Plaintiff were reasonable and necessary in order to represent her; that the 
Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five motions made by the Defendant to lower his 
child support and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each time by the Court; and 
that the Plaintiff was forced to incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to compel to 
obtain information regarding the Defendant's financial records. The Court finds that the Plaintiff 
has a need for attorney's fees; that the Defendant has a greater ability to earn income than the 
Plaintiff; that the Defendant has the ability to pay for the Plaintiffs attorney fees; and the Court 
awards the Plaintiff $15,000.00 in attorney's fees. 
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20. Each party has certain post separation debts which should be assumed and 
paid by the party incurring the debt. The debt to Donna Melle incurred by the Plaintiff is not a 
marital debt and the Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay said debt. The debt to Jane 
Bova is not a marital debt and the Defendant should be required to assume and pay said debt. 
21. Plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial which the Court will address after 
judgment in this matter has been entered. 
22. The parties should be required to execute any and all necessary documents 
to effectuate the terms set forth herein. 
The Court having heretofore entered it Findings of Fact does now enter its 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction herein to grant the Plaintiff and the Defendant a 
Decree of Divorce with the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Each party should be awarded a Decree of Divorce against the other with 
the same to become final upon entry. 
3. The parties should be awarded joint legal custody of the minor children; 
however, all decision-making authority regarding the activities of the children, including, but not 
limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports activities, etc. should remain 
solely with the Plaintiff and she should have final decision authority with respect to all issues 
regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the Plaintiff should 
discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the Defendant to obtain his input but the 
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final decision-making authority regarding the children's medical care and related issues should 
remain with the Plaintiff. The parties should be required to exchange information concerning the 
health, education and welfare of the children. 
The Plaintiff should have physical custody of the minor children and the Defendant 
should have visitation with the children. 
The Defendant should be entitled to visitation as follows: The Defendant should 
have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of visitation on the alternating week 
schedule should be from Wednesday after school until Monday morning when the Defendant 
should return the children to school. The second period of visitation on the alternating week 
visitation should be from Thursday after school until Monday morning when the Defendant 
returns the children to school. 
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation should still alternate 
weekly as follows: The first period of visitation should commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. 
until Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant should 
have the children from Thursday at 1.00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. 
The Defendant's visitation should not interfere with the children's pre-scheduled 
activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when school is not in session. 
The parties' holiday and birthday visitation should be pursuant to U.C. A. 30-3-35. 
The Defendant should be entitled to have the children for four weeks of visitation 
in the summer school vacation period wherein the Defendant should be entitled to have the 
children for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period as a portion of his summer visitation . 
The Defendant should be required to inform the other by May 1 of each year as to the dates he 
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intends to have the children for the summer visitation periods. Defendant's summer visitation 
should have precedence over Plaintiffs summer visitation. 
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for a period of 21 days or 
more, the Defendant should be entitled to exercise his regular visitation on days 15, 16 & 17 of 
that 21-day period. In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14 days or more, 
the Plaintiff should be entitled to have the children returned to her for the time period as set forth 
hereinabove. 
4. Defendant should pay child support to Plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.00 per 
month, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of the month and the balance on or before the 
20th day of each month. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the child support should be 
based upon the sole custody worksheet irrespective of the amount of days per month that the 
Defendant has the children for visitation. 
5. The Defendant should pay one-half of Plaintiff s actual work-incurred day 
care costs and payment should be made on or before the 1st day of each month. 
6. The Defendant should be obligated to pay the sum of $1,200.00 per month 
to the Plaintiff as alimony. Alimony should be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of 
each month. Alimony payable to the Plaintiff should terminate at such time upon the Plaintiffs 
cohabitation with a person of the opposite gender, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of 
the Divorce Decree herein, whichever event occurs first. 
7. The Defendant should be required to continue to pay for and maintain his 
life insurance policy in an amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children 
with the Plaintiff as trustee of any proceeds. The Defendant should be required to provide proof 
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of insurance or before the 5th day of January of each year. | 
8. The Plaintiff should be awarded the marital residence, at her option or it 
may be sold. If the Plaintiff opts to keep the marital residence, the equity therein should be 
divided equally between the parties and the Defendant awarded one half of the equity subject to 
certain offsets as set forth herein. If the home is sold, the net sales proceeds after payment of the 
sales costs and the first mortgage should be divided equally between the parties with the 
Defendant's one half of the equity subject to certain offsets as set forth herein. 
Commencing December 15, 1995, until the marital home is either refinanced by the 
Plaintiff in her own name or the home is sold, the mortgage should be paid by the Defendant and 
he should be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the monthly mortgage 
payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth hereinabove. 
The Defendant should be required to assume and pay the monthly indebtedness 
associated with the line of credit until the residence is sold or Plaintiff refinances the residence. 
9. The parties should file joint 1994 income tax returns. The parties should 
be required to bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00 assessed on the early 
withdrawal of the IRA which amount equals $645.00 respectively. The Defendant should be 
required to pay the balance of the penalty associated with the early withdrawal in the 
approximate sum of $6,210.00. 
The 1994 taxes should be paid equally from the sales proceeds of the marital 
residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home. The amounts owing as taxes for 1994 should 
be held in an escrow account and any amount not used to pay taxes should be divided equally 
between the parties. The tax penalty of $7,500.00 should remain in the escrow account until paid. 
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The outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family Affairs, in 
the sum of $750.00 and Dr. Stewart in the sum of $2,069.40 including interest and carrying costs 
thereon until paid in full, should be paid from the sales proceeds of the home, if the Plaintiff 
chooses to sell the home. If the Plaintiff elects to keep the marital residence, said amounts should 
be charged against each party's share of the equity in the marital residence. 
10. If the Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital home, she should be required to 
refinance the home in her own name and bear the costs of refinancing. No deductions should be 
allowed for realtor fees if the Plaintiff refinances the home. To determine the Defendant's equity 
in the marital residence, the mortgage of $176,165.00 should be deducted from the appraised 
value of $385,000.00 and the balance should be divided in half. From the Defendant's share of 
the equity, the following amounts should be deducted: the $29,597.00 awarded to the Plaintiff as 
her one half of the $75,000.00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant ($36,047.00 previously 
ordered less one half of the $12,900.00 representing the portion of the $75,000.00 the Court 
allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties); Plaintiffs attorney's 
fees equal to $15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set forth hereinabove; plus 
all of the $7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum of $645.00 and one half 
of the outstanding amounts owed to Family Affairs, real property appraiser and Dr. Stewart. 
11. Each party should be awarded those items of personal property in their 
respective possession. In addition, the Defendant should deliver to Plaintiff the camera case, 
lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in her possession and she should be awarded 
the same; the Plaintiff should be awarded the Gorman lithograph; and the Plaintiff should deliver 
to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated with the Sea Doos, including the surf 
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board, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he should be awarded. 
The Defendant should be awarded the Sea Doo water crafts. 
The Defendant should be awarded the following marital assets: 
Household Items 
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos) $ 11,050.00 
1992 Subaru SVX $ 2,825.00 
Zions Checking Account $ 250.00 
Zions Money Market Account $ 600.00 
IRA Withdrawal $ 75,000.00 
Total $ 89,725.00 
The Plaintiff should be awarded the following marital assets: 
Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00 
1994 Subaru $ 1,795.00 
Feb. '95 IRA distributions $ 1,200.00 
Total $ 17,631.00 
Due to the disparity in the values awarded to each party, the Defendant should be 
required to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00 which will compensate the Plaintiff for the 
difference in the personal property award. Said amount should be deducted from the Defendant's 
share of the equity in the marital residence. 
12. The following retirement accounts and brokerage accounts: Prudential 
Securities, Brandywine, the Fidelity account, the Strong account and the Mass Mutual account 
valued as of the date of trial plus any increases accruing thereon should be awarded equally to the 
parties. 
13. The Plaintiff should be required to maintain her nresent health insurance 
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which provides coverage for the parties' minor children, so long as it is available to her through 
her employment at a reasonable cost. If the Defendant can obtain comparable coverage as that 
insurance carried by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he should able to do so and each party should share 
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by the parent for the children's 
portion of the insurance. The children's portion of the premium should be a per capita share of 
the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children should be calculated by dividing 
the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result 
by the number of children herein and dividing that portion attributable to the children by one-half 
The provisions as set forth in UCA 78-45-7.15 should apply herein and said provisions should be 
incorporated herein by this reference. Each party should share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the 
minor children If one of the parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said 
party should be required to provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other 
party within thirty days of payment. 
14. The tax exemptions for the minor children should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff; however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax advantage by 
claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, the Defendant should be entitled to 
"purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The purchase price should be the difference 
between the taxes paid by the Plaintiff using the exemption and the taxes paid by her if she does 
not use the exemption. 
15. The trust accounts held in the children's names, including the trust for 
Melissa Bova, should remain as trusts for the benefit of the children as now established. 
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16. The Defendant should be required to pay the Plaintiff $15,000.00 for the 
use of her attorney in this matter with said amount to be offset against the marital residence as set 
forth hereinabove. 
17. The Plaintiff should be required to assume and her pay her post separation 
debts incurred in her own name and the debt to her mother, Donna Melle. The Defendant should 
be required to assume and pay his post separation debts and the debt to his mother, Jane Bova. 
18. The Court should address Plaintiffs a motion for a new trial after 
judgment in this matter has been entered. 
19. The parties should be required to execute any and all necessary documents 
to effectuate the terms set forth hprein. 
DATED: 
e
BY THE COURT: 
%°*%, J^$4*- Noel 
\ ^ ' » n t t W c t Court Judge 
""I'umm^ 
Approval As to Form: 
Kenneth Okazaki 
Attorney for Defendant 
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, KENNETH OKAZAKI: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by 
the Plaintiff shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) 
days from the date of the service of this notice. 
DATED this V day of September, 1996. 
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS 
EvelynL. Saunders, 
Attojarey for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document this -^ day of September, 1996 to the following: 
Kenneth Okazaki 
City Centre I 
Suite 900 
178 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
u v 
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ADDENDUM B: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
HG, 
Evelyn L Saunders #2864 * - P ! I C l i 
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS SUMMIT COUNTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff ' r ; /1 ! 
401 Main Street 
P O Box 3418 Uer.o.ou.T.r. ^ , cy 
Park City, Utah 84060 B>' 7T"T7^r—~^^ 
J
 Deputy Cai; 
(801)649-7496 I ¥ J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAHl 
DEBORAH A MELLE, 
Plaintiff, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. : 
CHARLES M BOVA, : Civil No 94-43-00105DA 
Defendant * Judge Frank G Noel 
The above entitled matter came on for trial on October 24, 25, and 26, 1995 
before the above entitled Court, the Honorable Frank G Noel, District Judge, presiding Plaintiff 
was present and represented by counsel, Evelyn L Saunders Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Kenneth Okasaki During the trial, the parties reached a stipulation with 
respect to the custody of the minor children which stipulation was placed upon the record by the 
parties As to the remaining issues, the Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, 
having heard testimony presented by the parties, having received exhibits on behalf of the parties 
and otherwise being fully informed in the premises took the matter under advisement The Court, 
at the conclusion of trial, invited the parties to submit comments to the Court upon receipt of the 
minute entry in order to address any items the parties felt that the Court may have inadvertently 
overlooked or wherein the Court may have made mathematical errors. The Court issued its 
decision by Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995. The parties subsequently submitted 
comments on the Court's Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995, which comments the court 
took under consideration. The court additionally heard from the parties at a scheduled hearing 
dated April 14, 1996 in response to various motions filed with the Court. A separate order was to 
be submitted with respect to said motions. The court issued a second Minute Entry, dated April 
22, 1996 which addressed the comments of the parties that had been submitted to the Court in 
written form. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
does now order as follows: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. Decree of Divorce: Plaintiff and Defendant are both awarded a Decree of 
Divorce against the other, severing the bonds of matrimony, with the same to become final upon 
entry. 
2. Custody and Visitation: The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the 
minor children; however, all decision making authority regarding the activities of the children, 
including, but not limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports activities, etc. 
shall remain solely with the Plaintiff and she shall have final decision authority with respect to all 
issues regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the Plaintiff 
shall discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the Defendant to obtain his input but 
the final decision making authority regarding the children's medical care and related issues shall 
remain with the Plaintiff. The parties shall exchange information concerning the health, education 
2 
I o ; j l JBQ0:<' . ; ' PAGE G ' : 2 
and welfare of the children. 
The Plaintiff shall have physical custody of the minor children and the Defendant 
shall have visitation with the children as follows: 
The Defendant shall have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of 
visitation on the alternating week schedule shall be from Wednesday after school until Monday 
morning when the Defendant shall return the children to school. The second period of visitation 
on the alternating week visitation shall be from Thursday after school until Monday morning when 
the Defendant shall return the children to school. 
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation shall alternate weekly as 
follows: The first period of visitation shall commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. until Monday 
morning at 8.00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant shall have the 
children from Thursday at 1:00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. 
The Defendant's visitation shall not interfere with the children's pre-scheduled 
activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when school is not in session. 
The parties' holiday and birthday visitation shall be pursuant to U.C. A. §30-3-35. 
The Defendant shall be entitled to have the children for four weeks of visitation in 
the summer school vacation period wherein the Defendant shall be entitled to have the children 
for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period as a portion of his summer visitation . The 
Defendant shall inform the Plaintiff by May 1 of each year as to the dates he intends to have the 
children for the summer visitation periods. Defendant's summer visitation schedule shall have 
precedence over the Plaintiffs summer visitation schedule. 
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for a period of 21 consecutive 
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days or more, the Defendant shall be entitled to exercise his regular visitation on days 15, 16 and 
17 of said 21-day period In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14 
consecutive days or more, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to have the children returned to her for the 
time period as set forth hereinabove. 
3. Child Support: The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$1,400.00 per month as child support, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of each month 
and the balance on or before the 20th day of each month. 
4. Child Care Costs: Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.16, Defendant shall 
pay to Plaintiff one-half of her work-incurred day care costs. Payment shall be due on or before 
the 1st day of each month. 
5. Alimony: The Defendant shall pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the sum of 
$1,200.00 per month Said alimony shall be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of each 
month. Alimony payable to the Plaintiff shall terminate upon the Plaintiffs cohabitation with a 
person of the opposite sex, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of the Divorce Decree 
herein, whichever event occurs first. 
6. Life Insurance: The Defendant shall pay for and maintain his existing life 
insurance policy in an amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children with 
the Plaintiff named as trustee of any proceeds. The Defendant shall provide proof of insurance 
and beneficiary designation on or before the 5th day of January of each year. 
7. Marital Residence: The Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence, at her 
option, or if she does not opt to keep the residence, said residence shall be sold. If the Plaintiff 
opts to keep the marital residence, the equity therein of $208,835.00 shall be divided equally 
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between the parties and the Defendant shall be awarded one half of the equity subject to certain 
offsets as set forth herein. If said residence is sold, the net sales proceeds after payment of the 
sales costs and the first mortgage shall be divided equally between the parties, provided however, 
the Defendant's share of the equity shall be subject to certain offsets as set forth herein. 
Commencing December 15, 1995, until said residence is either refinanced by the 
Plaintiff in her own name or the residence is sold, the first mortgage shall be paid by the 
Defendant and he shall be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the 
monthly mortgage payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth 
hereinabove. Defendant shall assume and pay the monthly payment associated with the line of 
credit until the Plaintiff refinances the residence or the property is sold. 
8. 1994 Income Tax Returns: The parties shall file joint 1994 federal and 
I 
state income tax returns. The parties shall bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00 
assessed on the early withdrawal of the Defendant's IRA which amount equals $645.00, 
respectively. The Defendant shall pay the balance of the penalty associated with the early 
withdrawal in the approximate sum of $6,210.00. 
The 1994 taxes shall be paid equally from each party's share of the sales proceeds 
I 
of the marital residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the same. The amounts owing as taxes for 
1994 shall be held in an escrow account and any amount not used to pay taxes shall, subject to the 
offsets described herein, be divided equally between the parties. The tax penalty of $7,500.00 
shall remain in the escrow account until paid. 
The outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family Affairs in 
the sum of $750 00 and Dr Elizabeth Stewart in the sum of $2, 069.40 plus interest thereon and 
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any carrying costs which accrued until paid in full, shall be paid from the sale proceeds of the 
marital residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the same. If the Plaintiff elects to keep the 
marital residence, said amounts shall be charged against each party's share of the equity in the 
marital residence. 
9. Offsets Against Defendant's Equity in Marital Residence: If the Plaintiff 
chooses to keep the marital residence, she shall be required to refinance the home in her own 
name and bear the costs of refinancing. No deductions shall be allowed for realtor fees if the 
Plaintiff refinances the home. To determine the Defendant's equity in the marital residence, if the 
Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital residence, the stipulated amount $176,165.00 shall be 
deducted from the appraised value of $385,000.00 and the balance shall be divided in half. From 
the Defendant's share of the equity, the following amounts shall be deducted: the $29,597.00 
awarded to the Plaintiff as her one half of the $75,000.00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant 
($36,047.00 previously ordered less one half of the $12,900.00 representing the portion of the 
$75,000.00 the Court allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties); 
Plaintiffs attorney's fees equal to $15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set 
forth hereinabove; plus all of the $7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum 
of $645.00 and one half of the outstanding amounts owed to Family Affairs and Dr. Elizabeth 
Stewart. 
10. Personal Property: Each party shall be awarded those items of personal 
property in their respective possession. In addition, the Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff the 
camera case, lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in her possession and she shall 
be awarded the same; the Plaintiff is awarded the Gorman lithograph; and the Plaintiff shall 
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deliver to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated with the Sea Doos, including the 
surfboard, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he is awarded. 
The Defendant is awarded the Sea Doo water crafts. 
The Defendant is awarded the following marital assets: 
Household Items 
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos) $ 11,050.00 
1992 Subaru SVX $ 2,825.00 
Zions Checking Account $ 250.00 
Zions Money Market Account $ 600.00 
IRA Withdrawal $ 75,000.00 
Total $ 89,725.00 
The Plaintiff is awarded the following marital assets: 
Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00 
1994 Subaru $ 1,795.00 
Feb. '95 IRA distributions $ 1,200.00 
Total $ 17,631.00 
Due to the disparity in the values awarded to each party, the Defendant shall pay 
to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00, as set forth in paragraph 9 hereinabove, which will 
compensate the Plaintiff for the difference in the personal property award. Said amount shall be 
deducted from the Defendant's share of the equity in the marital residence. 
11. Brokerage and Retirement Accounts: The following retirement accounts 
and brokerage accounts: Prudential Securities, Brandywine, Fidelity, Strong and the Mass 
Mutual account valued as of the date of trial, plus any increases accruing thereon, should be 
awarded equally to the parties. 
12. The Plaintiff shall maintain her present health insurance which provides 
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coverage for the parties5 minor children, so long as it is available to her through her employment 
at a reasonable cost. If the Defendant can obtain comparable coverage as that insurance carried 
by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he shall be permitted to do so. Each party shall share equally the out-
of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by the parent for the children's portion of the 
insurance. The children's portion of the premium shall be a per capita share of the premium 
actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium 
amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the 
number of children herein and dividing the portion attributable to the children by one-half. The 
provisions as set forth in UCA§ 78-45-7.15 shall apply herein and said provisions are 
incorporated herein by this reference. Each party shall share equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor 
children If one of the parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said party 
shall be required to provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other party 
within thirty days of payment. 
13. Tax Exemptions: The tax exemptions for the minor children shall be 
awarded to the Plaintiff, however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax 
advantage by claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, the Defendant shall be 
entitled to "purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The purchase price shall be the 
difference in taxes owing if the Plaintiff uses the exemptions and that amount of taxes owing if she 
does not use the exemption. 
14. Children's Trust Accounts: The trust accounts held in the children's 
names, including the trust for Melissa Bova, shall remain as trusts for the benefit of the children as 
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now established. 
15. Attorney's Fees and Costs: The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff 
$15,000.00 for the use of her attorney in this matter with said amount to be offset against the 
Defendant's equity in marital residence as hereinabove set forth. 
16. Debts and Obligations: The Plaintiff shall assume and pay her post 
separation debts incurred in her own name and the debt to Donna Melle. The Defendant shall 
assume and pay his post separation debts and the debt to his mother, Janie Bova. 
17. Execution of Documents: The paries shall execute any and all 
necessary documents to effectuate the terms set forth herein. a ents to effectuate the ter s set rorth herein. 
«»!>»"»'»,,BY THE COURT: 
MSttJK 
Approval As to Form: 
Kenneth Okazaki 
Attorney for Defendant 
c:docs\Melle\dd 
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, KENNETH OKAZAKI: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by 
the Plaintiff shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5) 
days from the date of the service of this notice. 
DATED this >^ day of September, 1996. 
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS 
<~) 
JEvelynlT. Saunders, 
[ Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on this day of September, 1996,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Ken Okazaki, Esq. 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
178 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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IN THE _Third_ 
Summit 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Debbie Melle_ 
vs. 
Charles Bova 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 94-43-00105 DA 
MOTHER FATHER COMBINE 
D 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted 
children of this mother and father for whom 
support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross 
monthly income. Refer to Instructions for 
definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is 
actually paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered 
for this case). 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. 
(Do not enter obligations ordered for the 
children in Line 1) . 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 
of the children in Present Home Worksheet for 
either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c and 2d from 2a. This 
is the Adjusted Gross Income for child 
support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the 
number of children in Line 1 to the Support 
Table. Find the Combined Support Obligation. 
Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly 
gross in Line 2a by the COMBINED adjusted 
monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent 
to obtain the parent's share of the Base 
1 Support Obligation. 
II/III// 
mum 
mi 
$2,386 
— 
— 
— 
$2,386 
///III// 
III 11 III 
///III// 
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20% 
$ " 
/////// 
/////// 
mi 
$9,583 
— 
_ 
— 
$9,583 
/////// 
Ill/Ill 
/////// 
IIIIII 
80% 
$1,400 
~2 1 
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/////i/\ inn ill 
II 
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n 
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II 
$11,969 
* 
$1,400 
** 
11 III III 
mi nil 
II 
in m i\ 
mi nil 
ii \ 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in 
Line 6 for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from 
the Low Income Table. 
$1,400 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother (X) Father 
I H h«» 
^DtK-l^-l^b lb* 44 hKUil summit county 
Utaft DR3/ORS 
Universal Income vitw>olding 
IU 1 0 ^ 1 0 4 3 f DU^ r.eu 
/ " 
IN THE 
IN AND FOR 
T H i rxJL JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
6u*~x^VK COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
bgtSoTZ./=\H W E V t e 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
UNIVERSAL INCOME WITHHOLDING 
INFORMATION 
Civil No. ^ 4 : HB - OCM Og 
Judge F r o l i c £> . N o J 
[l 1 . PLAIKTIFT'S KAXLXKC ADDRESS 
11 4 . SOCIAL SECURITY KUHBER 1 S- DATE OF BIRTH 
jl 7* EMPLOrER KAHE 
I 2 - STATE 
i UT 
1 3* ZIP 
6 . TELEPttDKE KIMSER 
B. TELEPHONE HUKfiER 
II 9 . EMPLOYER ADDRESS -
||_ t"7 3 e : Moo S * > 3 3 o - "" " 5 * u T 0<MdG C i l Y 
1 0 . STATE ! 11* ZIP 
^ m i t 
If 1 2 , DETEKDAWT'S KAJLIRC ADDRESS 
jj I S - SOCIAL SECURIT* NUMBER 16 . DACE OF BIRTH 
II 18. EMPLOYER HAWE 
5 P I M E ( ^ e ^ ^ O L <£- P t o r J t e H T ^ V A L L O f ' WotS€>. 
1 3 . STATE 
U T 
U . ZIP 
1 7 . TELEPHONE NIKBER 
1 9 . TZLZPEQhT lftJHBER 
Ij 2 0 , EMPLOYER ADDRESS j 2 1 . STAT? 
u~r 1 
2 2 . ZIP 
: 
If 2 3 , CHILDREN BORK Of THIS WARRIACE . / ," _ "7, 
| NAME ' •" •" *• DATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL S2GTRTTT IfUKBER 
1 * fAitf-euu B&VA 
B. 
II Cs 
| D. ' 
| £ ' '•' 
F. 
: 3 - 1 5 - - 5 4 
1 - • 5 - n -
4 
5 ^ 5 - S I - k' |5<* 
5 X 5 - ^ 1 - - 7 C 7 ? 
, 
. * 
• 
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NOTE: If address of the obligor (person owing support) is unknown you must check 
the appropriate box below and attach the appropriate affidavits-
If the obligor (person owing support) is unemployed you must ch^ efc *h«» 
appropriate box below and attach the appropriate af f idavits. 
Obligor Is unemployed - affidavit attached. 
Obligor cannot be located j- affidavit attached. 
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